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Before the 2007-8 financial crisis brought everyone back to earth, fair value accounting was in the vogue, akin the
blue-eyed boy of accounting. However, when the crash happened, politicians, policy analysts and pundits looking for
something, someone to blame, lined up fair value accounting against the wall, together with regulators asleep at the
watch, excessive use of leverage, and so on. Fair value accounting – simply defined as the booking of numbers
based on current market value – was named a catalyst in exacerbating the crisis.
From the rubbles of the fall sparked by the America’s sub-prime real estate crisis, the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) came together in late 2008 to
reconsider all aspects of the accounting for financial instruments, and to develop a common guide to fair value
measurement.
“One more crisis”
To “fair” or not to “fair” – this, according to Stephen H. Penman, is now “the big debate in accounting”. Penman,
who is George O. May Professor and the Morgan Stanley Research Scholar at Columbia University's Graduate School
of Business, was delivering a lecture
(http://www.accountancy.smu.edu.sg/news/soareach/10jun/school/penman.asp)at SMU's School of Accountancy
(http://www.accountancy.smu.edu.sg/)as the Cheng Tsang Man Professor, where he attempted answers to the
question: Is fair value accounting fair accounting for shareholder value?
It is a debate that Singapore cannot avoid paying attention to, given its bid to become the regional financial centre
and the Singapore Accounting Standards Council’s (ASC) commitment to fully adopt the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) developed by the IASB by 2012. What the two major accounting standards bodies
ultimately decide on will have implications not only on how companies in Singapore will have to book their accounts
in future, but also affect the external financial environment in which the island’s wide-open economy will have to
navigate.
To where are the winds blowing on this fair value issue? Has the crash and bang of the last crisis changed the
perception towards fair value accounting? Will fair value accounting continue to gain popularity? After all, fair value,
despite the criticisms, gives potential investors the current market value of financial instruments. So where is it
headed? Penman’s personal take, to laughter from the audience, was: “I think there has to be one more crisis.”
FASB vs IASB
Indeed, FASB and IASB appear to be seeking not so much to remove fair values from balance sheets all over the
world, but to determine the extent it would advance. In America, the scale seems to be tilting towards more fair
value, with the FASB proposing that all financial instruments, including bank loans and deposits, be reported at fair
value. On the other hand, the international body, IASB, leans towards a mix of fair value and amortised cost, seeking
to retain amortised cost accounting for bank loans, although with the option of fair value accounting.
The public consultation process on the respective proposals is still on-going so the dust has not settled yet.
Nevertheless, the FASB’s proposal, in particular the momentum towards fair-valuing bank loans and core deposits,
worries Penman.
“This is quite a radical stand. We in accounting have always had the discipline to say that you don’t book assets
from trading with customers until the customer turns up and actually gives you a claim against them,” said Penman.
Yet in an attempt to recognise and value intangible assets, the FASB is proposing that “in calculating the present
value of the average core deposit liability amount, entities should consider future core deposits”, to which, Penman
noted is not the same as the mark-to-market account, but rather, for the bank to put in the accounts, estimates of
the deposits it would get in the future. “Think about it; if any manager of a business starts booking future sales or
starts booking sales when we don’t have a customer, we lock them up. We say, ‘How can you!’” he said.
Graham’s value
A self-professed disciple of the so-called Benjamin Graham doctrine of fundamental investing, Penman refutes fair-
value proponents’ argument that historical cost accounting is like driving down the street looking in the rear-vision
direction. Instead, he argues that historical cost accounting “is quite forward looking” because “if I know the sales
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now, the margins, I’m going to have a very good predictor of what the future value might be.”
Graham (1894 - 1976) was an American economist and Wall Street analyst whose seminal work, The Intelligent
Investor, was once famously described by Warren Buffett, Sage of Omaha, as “the best book about investing ever
written”. Graham, according to Penman, teaches one to beware of prices. “Price is not value. Price is what you pay,
value is what you get. There is a difference,” he said.
Penman added that there must a distinct line between what one knows and what one is speculating. Almost by
default, there is some element of speculation for any investor as no one can say and ensure what the future will be.
To be sure, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with speculation. What Graham teaches is not so much not to
speculate, but to base speculation on known factors. Only then can investors challenge the price. And in challenging
the price, Graham’s advice is to be very careful not to include price in the calculation, because, then, one loses the
ability to challenge the price.
So what does this mean for accounting professionals? Instead of trying to conjecture the current prices of assets
and liabilities, accountants should remember that it is not their job to speculate on prices – leave that to the
analysts and the investors they serve. Rather, Penman said, accountants should keep prices out of the accounting
so that speculation by analysts and investors can be based on a history of objective evidence. To do otherwise is to
inject “water in the balance sheet” that quickly vaporises when the sun comes out. There have been plenty of
significant lessons in this aspect: the Great Depression in 1929, the technology bubble in late 1990s, the Enron
debacle in 2001, and most recently, the US housing crisis.
Greasing the wheels
During the talk, Penman also elaborated on how the use of fair value accounting played a part in the crisis. Loan
securitisation, which began some two decades ago, took off in a big way in the years leading up to the bust – but
not before originating banks, mortgage brokers and the securities industry, merrily enticed home buyers to take up
cheap loans, and then packaging them and hawking them off as investment grade products sold throughout the
financial system.
With fair value accounting, these securities were marked-to-market, moving the loans away from the information at
the originating banks. At the same time, the banks were easy with their lending, and interest rates kept at historical
low to fuel the post 9-11 economy. Due diligence to determine the credit worthiness of the borrower became so
minimal that tax returns were not required and 10 minutes was all it took for loans to be approved, said Penman. So,
while the economy was chugging along nicely, with interest rates kept predictably low and real estate prices moving
upwards, such practices could still be sustained.
A bubble of mortgages with dubious credit worthiness was created and this pushed up the fair value of loans made
out by the banks. Simply put, banks were then lending against bubble prices in their books, dividends and bonuses
were paid out of fake profits, increasing leverage and perpetuating the vicious cycle. When the crash came, big
chunks of the market basically vapourised and fair-valued prices plunged, forcing lenders to take huge write-downs,
pushing their bottom line deep into the red. “Clearly, cheap money was a problem, so was securitisation and
leverage, but fair value accounting was the grease in the wheel,” said Penman.
Risky vehicles
Fair value accounting flies in the face of conventional accounting wisdom, which demands that accounting should be
independent and earnings have to be earned. That is a key issue, Penman noted. Yet, fair value accounting gives
earnings as estimates based on management’s expectations. This has the effect of magnifying risks that investors
have to bear, opening the door for accounting acrobatics, performed using the likes of Special Purpose Entity (SPE)
and Structure Investment Vehicle (SIV) that were kept off the balance sheet, to come back and bite investors.
Thanks to the Enron debacle and the sub-prime mortgage crisis, SPE and SIV have become bywords not for savvy
financial engineering but for skeletons in the closet.
Furthermore, with fair value accounting, borrowing is no longer against hard assets but against expectations. It
encourages dividends and bonuses to be paid out of conjectured profits, which Penman denounced as a “Ponzi
scheme” that pays dividends without having actually realised value. He pointed out that fair value accounting is
merely a journal entry, not a real cash transaction, meaning the company has to borrow to pay the dividends. Little
wonder that the end result is an outraged American public angry with Wall Street executives paying themselves
huge bonuses out of fair value profits and with the subsequent massive government bailouts justified by reasons like
“too big to fail”, leaving American tax payers to hold the bag.
Hedge funds and coal furnaces
So if fair value accounting in its current formulation helps to create bubbles and pro-cyclical pressure, what is the
alternative? The solution might come from a quarter of the financial industry not exactly the most well-known for its
stability and transparency: hedge funds. Penman observed that while hedge funds employ fair value accounting or
mark-to-market accounting, if there are liquid assets, they do this as a voluntary association, where the agreement
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with investors is to trade in and out of the fund at Net Asset Value (NAV).
However, there is a control. That is, when there is doubt about the value, the fund gets locked up or side pockets,
that cannot be traded, are established until the uncertainty is resolved. The moral of the story as Penman puts it is:
“Let’s not recognise value-added in business until you get or realise value. Don’t trade until there is resolution of
uncertainty.”
One instance of appropriately applying fair value accounting is when shareholders’ value varies one-to-one with
market price. For example, if you hold a bond and the price of the bond goes up, fair value is appropriate as your
wealth is directly tied to the movement of market prices. However, for most businesses, including lending and
borrowing banks, value comes not in the trading on prices but rather from trading with customers.
Most businesses are involved in producing income from delivering products to customers. For example, if a steel
company holds a pile of coal, it does not actually make money if the price of coal goes up. Instead, it does so by
feeding the coal into the blast furnace where steel is produced, and then, with buyers found, finally recognising
value from the output price of selling the steel and the input price of buying coal. In other words, most businesses
do not get value from exit prices but from arbitraging input and output market prices. To them, exit price is only the
revenue, and not profit.
Fair value is also appropriate if you have a matched balance sheet. According to Penman, the common
misconception about fair value accounting is to focus on updating old costs and getting the balance sheet right to
indicate asset value. However, it is not possible to recognise a loss or gain on an asset without recognising loss on
the associated liability.
Accounting for loans
And when it comes to loan accounting, Penman proposes the following steps: first, the bank makes the loan but
records the loan at historical transaction amount. Then for a few years, it simply recognises or records interest
income at the risk free rate until credit worthiness has been established.Only when the customer’s credit worthiness
has been established by indicators that the bank had previously laid down – such as when the customer has been
keeping up payments and customer’s income is going up – does the bank then recognise the difference between the
risk free rate and the loan rate.
Noting that banks are in the business of making money by exposing themselves to credit risks, Penman’s suggestion
is that they should thus only recognise and book the credit premium when uncertainty about collection has been
substantially reduced, and amortise the income over the number of years as they make money on the credit risk with
customer performance. That way, instead of recognising value speculatively through fair value accounting and
taking the hit when the customer cannot follow-through, the bank adheres to strict accounting standards, where
value is not recognised until the customer has performed.
Penman acknowledged that his idea is “very conservative accounting”, which probably will not sit down well with the
risk-taking culture of many finance hot shots – the same people who helped agitate the recent crisis. “For most
loans that are not growing, it wouldn’t make much of a difference, but in a growing business, it makes a difference –
such as lending to more sub-prime people,” he said.
Hopefully, there is no need for another crisis before lessons like these sink in.
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